Why Bengalis Are Not Indigenous in Bangladesh — And Why the Chakma, Marma & Other Hill Peoples Are

I. Introduction

The Smoke Over the Hills

It began not with a declaration of war, but with the roar of a bulldozer and the crackle of fire. In a remote village in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT), a Chakma elder stood watching the land his grandfather had cultivated—the jum fields that had fed his family for generations—being marked out with red flags. These flags did not signal a government development project or a new school; they signaled the arrival of settlers. When the elder protested, producing tattered documents from the British era, he was met with the cold barrel of a rifle and a sneering dismissal from a uniformed officer: "This is Bangladesh. Bengalis are the real owners here. You are guests." 

        Photo: Collected 

This scene, repeated in various forms across the hills for decades—from the burning of Longadu to the silent evictions in Bandarban—is not just a tragedy of property loss. It is the frontline of a fierce ideological war. It represents the clash between two competing claims: the state narrative that aggressively asserts Bengalis are the only "indigenous" sons of the soil, and the lived reality of the Chakma, Marma, Tripura, Mro, Bawm, and other hill peoples, who are fighting for their very existence as the true indigenous custodians of the land. The core problem in Bangladesh's Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) is the ongoing land dispute between indigenous Jumma peoples and Bengali settlers, fueled by historical displacement, government resettlement policies, and incomplete implementation of the 1997 Peace Accord.

The conflict in the Chittagong Hill Tracts is not a closed chapter of history but an active, structural crisis that dictates the daily reality of the region today. It persists primarily as a legal battle over land, where the state's refusal to recognize customary ownership traps indigenous families in a nightmare where their ancestral territory is seized as "government property," effectively turning them into squatters on their own soil. This dispossession fuels a desperate struggle for identity, as demographic engineering has reduced the indigenous population from a clear majority to nearly half, creating an existential fear of political irrelevance and cultural erasure. Ultimately, the violence has simply shifted from military insurgency to a modern fight for survival, characterized by economic strangulation and ecological destruction that threaten the community's future just as severely as the wars of the past.

II. How the World Defines "Indigenous" — And Why It Was Created

A Shield for the Vulnerable, Not a Sword for the Powerful

To understand why the hill tribes are indigenous and the majority population is not, we must first understand what the word "indigenous" actually means. It is not simply a synonym for "born in a country." The concept, as codified by the United Nations and the International Labour Organization (ILO), emerged from global human rights movements with a specific purpose: to protect small, distinct ethnic minorities who face marginalization and existential threats from a dominant state machinery.

The term was created precisely to prevent the kind of oppression described in the opening story. It is a legal shield designed for those who have retained social, cultural, economic, and political characteristics distinct from those of the dominant societies in which they live. "These people have a right to exist as they are, on their own land, with their own culture."

Global Parallels

Across the world, the pattern is consistent. "Indigenous" almost always refers to the minority with deep roots, not the ruling majority.

•                    India: The constitution recognizes "Adivasis" (tribals) and Scheduled Tribes, distinct from the mainstream caste-Hindu society.

•                    Pakistan: Small, unique groups like the Kalash people are recognized for their distinct indigenous heritage.

•                    Nepal: The state recognizes dozens of Janajati groups who have been historically marginalized by the ruling elites.

•                    The West: The Māori in New Zealand, Aboriginals in Australia, and Native Americans in the USA are all indigenous peoples living within nations dominated by settlers.

In every case, the definition relies on power dynamics. Indigenous peoples are those who were there before the imposition of modern state borders and who struggle to maintain their distinct institutions against a dominant culture.

The Dominant Majority: Ethnic Bengalis

Under the international definition, ethnic Bengalis are Native, but they are generally not classified as "Indigenous" in the human rights context.

·        Dominance: They comprise 98%+ of the population. They control the government, military, and legal system.

·       Culture: Their language (Bangla) and culture define the nation-state.

·       Role: They are the state-builders.

The Mismatch: While Bengalis have lived in the delta for millennia (being "native"), they hold the Dominant Political Power. Therefore, they do not need the special legal protections designed for "Indigenous" peoples.

 The Indigenous/Minority Groups: Pahari & Plains Adibashis

Groups such as the Chakma, Marma, Tripura and rest of the jumma peoples (in the Chittagong Hill Tracts) and the Santal, Garo, Oraon (in the plains) fit the international pattern perfectly.

·       Minority Status: They are numerically small minorities compared to the Bengali population.

·       Distinct Culture: They have distinct languages (Tibeto-Burman, Austroasiatic), religions (Buddhism, Christianity, Animism), and social institutions that differ from the Muslim/Hindu Bengali mainstream.

·       Non-Dominant: They have faced historical marginalization, displacement, and lack of political representation.

·      Territorial Connection: They have deep ancestral ties to specific regions (like the Hill Tracts) that predate the modern boundaries of the state.

·   In the Chittagong Hill Tracts: The argument is, "We had our own distinct territory and laws here before the modern state encompassed us."

·       In the Plains district of Bangladesh: The argument is, "We were the first tillers of this soil and have maintained our distinct community life despite being surrounded."

Both fulfill the International Definition because both represent distinct societies with pre-colonial/pre-state roots that are now non-dominant within the modern nation-state.

 III. Historical Context — Two Different Worlds: Plains vs. Hills

The Delta and The Mountains

Geography has written two very different histories in this region. The Bengali homeland has historically been the flat, fertile river deltas of Bengal. This society was formed over millennia through waves of migration, the expansion of Indo-Aryan culture, the spread of Islam, and settled wet-rice agrarianism. It is a civilization of the plains. In sharp contrast, the Chittagong Hill Tracts have historically been a world apart—a frontier that even the Mughals referred to as Kapas Mahal (Cotton Lands), largely outside their direct administrative control. The Chakma, Marma, Tripura, Mro, and others have lived here for centuries, governed by their own Circle Chiefs (Raja) and social norms and values. Their connection to the land is defined by administrative control. The Chakma, Marma, Tripura, Mro, and others have lived here for centuries, governed by their own Circle Chiefs (Raja) and social norms and values. Their connection to the land is defined by Jum (shifting) cultivation, clan-based societal structures, and languages rooted in the Tibeto-Burman and Arakanese families. These peoples did not "arrive" in Bangladesh; their homelands were swallowed by the borders drawn by British and Pakistani cartographers.

The Indigenous Homeland: Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT)

The Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) represents the clearest example in Bangladesh of an "Indigenous Homeland." It is not just a geographic region, but a distinct cultural sphere inhabited by peoples whose societies developed completely separately from the Bengali plains. Collectively known as the Jumma people (derived from their farming method, Jum), these groups—including the Chakma, Marma, Tripura, Mro, Bawm, Pankhua, Khumi, Khyang, Chak, Lusai, and Tanchangya—fulfill every criterion of the international definition of "Indigenous."

1. Distinct Economic System: Jum Cultivation

For centuries, the defining feature of this region was Jum (slash-and-burn or shifting cultivation).

·       Distinct from the Plains: While the Bengali majority practiced wet-rice plough agriculture in the flatlands, the Hill peoples mastered steep-slope cultivation.

·       Cultural Anchor: Jum is not just a farming technique; it is the foundation of their festivals, social calendar, and community bonds. It was this unique production of cotton via Jum that led the Mughals to designate the area "Kapas Mahal."

2. Distinct Political Institutions: The Circle System

Unlike the centralized administrative system of the plains, the CHT has retained a traditional three-tiered governance structure that exists alongside the modern state. This fits the ILO criterion of "retaining some or all of their own political institutions.

·       The Three Circles: The region is divided into three tax and administrative jurisdictions, each led by a hereditary Chief (Raja):

o   Chakma Circle (Rangamati area)

o   Bohmong Circle (Bandarban area)

o   Mong Circle (Khagrachari area)

·       Village Governance: Below the Chiefs are the Headmen (Mouza level) and Karbari (Village level). They resolve social disputes and manage land according to customary law, a system totally distinct from the Bengali court system.

3. Distinct Cultural & Linguistic Roots

The cultural divide between the CHT and the rest of Bangladesh is a divide between two major linguistic families of Asia.

·       Language: The CHT peoples speak languages rooted in the Tibeto-Burman and Arakanese families. This is entirely distinct from Bangla, which is an Indo-European language. Garo belongs to the Bodo-Garo branch of the Tibeto-Burman language family (which is part of the larger Sino-Tibetan family). Santali is the most widely spoken language of the Munda subfamily, which belongs to the larger Austroasiatic language family. This makes it distantly related to languages like Vietnamese and Khmer.

                                

·       Religion: The majority practice Buddhism (Chakma, Marma), Hinduism (Tripura), Christianity (Bawm, Lusai), or Animism (Mro), contrasting with the predominantly Muslim population of the plains. On the contrary in the plain land the vast majority of Garo community (over 90% in Bangladesh) have converted to Christianity (mostly Catholic and Baptist). The Shift from Songsarek to Christianity. The original Khasi religion is monotheistic, believing in U Blei Nongthaw (God the Creator). Today, a significant majority of Khasis in Bangladesh have converted to Christianity (Presbyterian and Catholic), though they retain their matrilineal customs. Santal peoples’ traditional religion is often called Sarnaism or Sari Dharam (Religion of Truth). It is fundamentally animistic. They believe spirits (Bonga) reside in nature—in trees, hills, and rivers. Worship takes place not in temples, but in a sacred grove called the Jaher Than (a cluster of Sal trees preserved near the village).

4. The Plain land indigenous peoples:

The Santals are descendants of the Austric-speaking Proto-Australoid race and are widely considered by historians to be the earliest settlers of Greater Bengal, predating the arrival of Indo-Aryans and the formation of settled Bengali society.

The Garo, who refer to themselves as A·chik Mande (literally "Hill People" or simply "People"), are one of the most culturally distinct Indigenous communities in the Bangladesh-India border region. They are particularly renowned for being one of the few remaining matrilineal societies in the world.

The Khasi people (who call themselves Ki Hynniew Trep, meaning "The Children of the Seven Huts") are a distinct Indigenous community primarily inhabiting the Khasi and Jaintia Hills of Meghalaya (India) and the bordering districts of Sylhet and Moulvibazar in Bangladesh. Like Garo people they are culturally renowned for their matrilineal society (one of the few surviving in the world) and their unique forest-based lifestyle in "Punjis" (clustered villages). They speak Khasi, which belongs to the Mon-Khmer family of the Austroasiatic group. This makes them linguistically distinct from their Tibeto-Burman neighbors (like the Garo or Chakma). They have 4 forms of language which they speak, write and formally use. These 4 forms are (War, Pnar, Khasi, Lyngngam)

The "Vulnerability" & Land Dispossession Argument

·       A defining characteristic of "Indigenous" status in international law is vulnerability to state power. The plain land ethnic groups have lost over 200,000 acres of ancestral land to the majority population and state acquisition, fitting the criteria of a marginalized people needing special protection.

Cultural Distinctiveness

·         Their social structures are fundamentally distinct from the Bengali majority. For example, the Garo (Mande) and Khasi people practice a matrilineal system (where lineage and property pass through the mother), which is entirely unique compared to the patriarchal Bengali society. The Santals follow the ‘Manjhi-Pargana’ system of self-governance, which predates the British legal system.

Legal Recognition & International Law

·       Although the Bangladesh Constitution (15th Amendment) uses the term "Tribes, Minor Races, and Ethnic Sects" (Article 23A), Bangladesh ratified ILO Convention 107 in 1972. This convention explicitly recognizes the rights of these populations to their traditionally occupied lands, validating their status under international law

5. Historical Precedence

Crucially, these communities established their societies in the Hills long before the arrival of the modern state or the Bengali settlers.

·       While the delta (plains) was being settled and cultivated by Bengali speakers, the Hills were considered a "wild" or separate frontier, inhabited by the Jumma peoples.

·       Significant Bengali migration into the Hill Tracts is a modern phenomenon (largely post-1979), meaning the Hill peoples are the indisputable "First Peoples" of that specific territory.

IV. Why Bengalis Cannot Be Classified as Indigenous

The Sociological Reality

The claim that "Bengalis are the indigenous people of Bangladesh" is a political slogan, not an anthropological fact. Here is why:

1.              The Dominant Majority Rule: Bengalis constitute over 98% of the population. They control the army, the parliament, the economy, and the cultural narrative. Under UN definitions, a dominant ethnic group that controls the state apparatus cannot claim "indigenous status" because the term exists specifically to protect minorities from that very state power.

2.              Lack of Ancestral Ties to the Hills: While Bengalis are native to the deltaic plains, they are not indigenous to the Chittagong Hill Tracts. The massive Bengali presence in the CHT today is the result of state-sponsored settlement programs (transmigration) initiated in the late 1970s and 80s, not ancient habitation.

3.              Vulnerability vs. Power: Indigenous status is defined by vulnerability—the risk of having one's land seized and culture erased. Bengalis do not face cultural erasure in Bangladesh; they are the erasers. The Chakma and Marma, however, fit every criterion of vulnerability.

Redefining the dominant Bengali majority as "Indigenous" would effectively weaponize the term against the very people it was designed to protect. By claiming this status, the majority could legally strip marginalized groups of their specific land rights and safeguards. Therefore, while Bengalis are undeniably native to the soil, the Chakma, Santal, Garo, and others are the true Indigenous Peoples—distinct, non-dominant societies struggling to survive under the pressure of the state.

The term "Indigenous" was created to stop oppression. If the majority claims the term, they strip it of its meaning and power, leaving the actual marginalized communities defenseless.

V. Why the Bangladesh Government Avoids Recognizing Indigenous Peoples

The Fear of Rights and Recognition

Why does the state vehemently refuse to use the term "Indigenous" (Adivasi), preferring terms like "Small Ethnic Minorities" or "Tribals"? The answer lies in international law.

If Bangladesh formally recognizes the hill peoples as indigenous, it triggers obligations under the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) and ILO Convention 169. This would mean the state must:

•                    Protect ancestral land rights (challenging the legality of Bengali settlements in the CHT).

•                    Obtain "Free, Prior and Informed Consent" before military or development projects.

•                    Grant higher degrees of regional autonomy.

This refusal is further fueled by a deep-seated anxiety regarding national sovereignty; the political elite fears that granting "Indigenous" status validates a "state within a state" and could fuel separatist movements under the banner of self-determination. Consequently, the government promotes the counter-narrative that ethnic Bengalis are the true "natives" of the delta, a legal maneuver that allows them to treat Indigenous lands as government property (Khas) and prioritize centralized control over the autonomy and survival of these marginalized communities. The state fears that recognition acts as a legal lever for land claims. It threatens the nationalist ideology of a homogeneous Bengali Muslim identity. To recognize the indigenous is to admit that the land does not belong solely to the majority—an admission the government is unwilling to make.

VI. The Big Fish vs. Small Fish Dynamic

The Politics of Swallowing

History is replete with examples of dominant cultures "swallowing" smaller nations. The Romans swallowed the Gauls; the Chinese state exerts immense pressure on Tibetan and Uyghur distinctiveness; the Pakistani state suppresses Baloch identity.

In Bangladesh, this is not a metaphor—it is a demographic and political reality. The "Big Fish" (the Bengali state machinery) is actively swallowing the "Small Fish" (the Jumma peoples).

This happens through the imposition of the Bengali language in schools, the militarization of the hills, and the systematic grabbing of land. By denying the hill peoples their indigenous status, the state tries to dissolve their unique identity into the belly of the general population, effectively saying, “You are not special, you are just a minority Bengali.”  The tragedy of the CHT is that the "Small Fish" are not asking to eat the "Big Fish"; they are simply asking for a separate corner of the pond where they can breathe. However, the state’s refusal to recognize their Indigenous status indicates a refusal to grant that space.

The reality is stark: Unless the state acknowledges the distinct rights of the Hill peoples, the dynamic will reach its natural conclusion—the complete digestion of the Jumma nations into the belly of the Bengali state, leaving them as nothing more than a folklore exhibit in a museum.

VII. What Is at Stake — Why Recognition Matters

Survival or Erasure

This debate is not academic; it dictates the future of over a dozen distinct ethnicities.

When the state refuses to recognize the Chakma, Marma, Santal, and others as Indigenous, it classifies them merely as "backward segments" of the general population. This legal void creates a vacuum where rights are stripped away.

       Without Recognition: The hill peoples remain "tribals" or "minorities" with no special claim to the land. They remain vulnerable to eviction, their languages fade from the curriculum, and their distinct political institutions (like the Hill District Councils) are eroded by central government interference.

Loss of Land (The "Khas" Trap): Without Indigenous status, ancestral forests and Jum lands are legally categorized as "Khas" (Government Public Property). The state can lease this land to the military, tourism developers, or Bengali settlers without consent, treating the original inhabitants as illegal squatters on their own soil.

Loss of Culture & Language: Dominant Bengali culture (language, religion, dress) becomes the only standard for "civilization." Indigenous languages are reduced to oral dialects without state protection, leading to a slow death of the mother tongue in schools and administration.

Loss of Political Autonomy: They remain subject to the decisions of a centralized bureaucracy in Dhaka. Local government bodies (like the Hill District Councils) remain powerless puppets, often led by hand-picked loyalists rather than true representatives.

Loss of Safety (Militarization): Without the special protections of international law, the heavy military presence in the CHT is justified as "national security." Indigenous people face arbitrary arrests, harassment, and violence with little legal recourse, as domestic law treats these incidents as standard law-and-order issues rather than human rights violations against a protected group

       With Recognition: They gain a global platform. They gain legal safeguards against military abuse and land grabbing. Most importantly, they gain the dignity of having their history acknowledged—the right to say, "We were here first, and this land is part of who we are."

Recognition acts as a legal shield. It transforms the relationship from "Ruler vs. Subject" to "State vs. Partner."

• Protection Under UNDRIP: Recognition triggers the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP). This is not just a document; it is a global standard that forces the state to respect collective rights, not just individual ones.
• Irrevocable Land Rights: It validates Customary Land Rights. The state would be legally bound to recognize that land belongs to the community that has tilled it for centuries, even without paper deeds. "Khas" land claims would become invalid on Indigenous territory
• The Power of "FPIC" (Legal Safeguard): This is the most critical tool. It grants the right to Free, Prior, and Informed Consent (FPIC). The military cannot build a base, and a corporation cannot build a resort, without the explicit permission of the local Indigenous council.
• Cultural Preservation: It mandates state funding for the preservation of distinct languages, religions, and social institutions. It forces the national curriculum to rewrite history books to include the pre-state history of these peoples.
• Respect & Dignity: It forces the "Big Fish" to acknowledge the "Small Fish" as equals. It validates their identity not as "guests" or "late settlers," but as the First Peoples of the land, restoring their moral authority and historical dignity.

"Without this status, they remain trespassers on the soil of their ancestors; with it, they reclaim the title deeds to their history and their future."

VIII. Conclusion — What Bangladesh Must Do & What the World Must Demand

The Path Forward

A.    Why Bangladesh Must Recognize Indigenous Peoples

Denying Indigenous status is a denial of history and a barrier to the nation's own progress. Recognition is essential for six key reasons:
  
Bangladesh stands at a moral crossroads. It cannot claim to be a champion of justice on the world stage while systematically disenfranchising the oldest inhabitants of its own territories. For the sake of historical truth, human rights, and sustainable peace in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, the state must abandon its denial.

·       For Justice: To acknowledge that the Jumma people  and Plains Adibashis are not "guests" or "latecomers," but distinct societies with the longest continuous history on their specific lands.

·       For Human Rights: To align domestic law with international standards (ILO Convention 169, UNDRIP), ensuring that the most vulnerable populations have legal protection against land grabbing and forced eviction.

·       For Historical Truth: To correct the national narrative that often erases the existence of the "Kapas Mahal" era and the distinct administrative history of the Hill Tracts.

·       For Peace in the CHT: The 1997 CHT Peace Accord remains largely unimplemented. Genuine peace cannot be built on a foundation of denial. Recognition is the first step toward rebuilding trust between the Hill peoples and the State.

·       The creation of a Plain Land Land Commission is widely regarded by experts, activists, as the only viable solution to stop the complete landlessness of the Santal, Garo, and Oraon peoples. Without it, the "paper law" of 1950 cannot stop the physical reality of dispossession. It is a long-cherished dream for indigenous people living in the plain lands of Bangladesh.

·       For International Legitimacy: As a leading contributor to UN Peacekeeping missions globally, Bangladesh undermines its own moral authority by denying the rights of its own Indigenous peoples at home.

  B. Why the International Community Must Act

Final Call to Action

The world cannot view this as an "internal matter" when the markers of ethnic cleansing—displacement, militarization, and settlement—are visible.

·       The stakes are existential: Without the protection of "Indigenous" status, the ancestral lands of the Jumma peoples are treated as "Khas" (government) land, open for settlement by the majority.

·       The pattern is clear: The unchecked militarization and state-backed settlement programs are designed to dilute the Indigenous population until they become a minority in their own homeland.

·       The responsibility: The international community defined "Indigenous" to stop these atrocities. It now has a duty to insist that Bangladesh applies this definition honestly.

To stop the slow erasure of the Chakma, Marma, and other hill peoples, Bangladesh must recognize them as Indigenous — and the world must insist that it does. Silence is no longer an option.

 

 

Peace on Paper Only? The Struggle for Indigenous Rights in the CHT

Yesterday, December 2nd, marked 28 years since the signing of the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) Peace Accord. In 1997, this treaty was hailed as a landmark achievement, promising to end decades of guerrilla warfare and grant substantial autonomy and rights to the indigenous Jumma peoples of southeastern Bangladesh.

Twenty-eight years is a long time. It is long enough for a generation to be born, grow up, and have children of their own in what was supposed to be a post-conflict era.

Yet, as we look at the CHT today, we must ask an uncomfortable question: Has peace truly been achieved, or does it merely exist on the paper it was written on?

The Promise of 1997

The CHT Accord was supposed to be a turning point. Signed between the government of Bangladesh and the Parbatya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti (PCJSS), the political representative of the indigenous groups, it laid out a roadmap for peace.

The promises were explicit:

1. Recognition of the distinct ethnic and cultural identity of the Jumma tribes.
2. A withdrawal of temporary military camps from the region.
3. Resolution of complex land disputes arising from state-sponsored settlement programs.
4. Regional autonomy through strengthened local government councils.

For a brief moment, there was genuine hope that the hills would see an end to bloodshed and cultural erasure.

The Reality of 2025

Fast forward to today, and that hope has curdled into frustration and renewed resistance. While major armed conflict has largely ceased, a "negative peace" prevails. The region remains heavily militarized, and the core pillars of the Accord remain unimplemented.

The visible frustration of the new generation was evident on the streets just this week in the lead-up to the anniversary.

Photo: Activists in Dhaka prepare a banner marking the anniversary of the CHT Accord. The red English text demands implementation, while the Bengali slogan on the right explicitly calls to "Free the hills from military rule."

The image above captures the current mood perfectly. The demand isn't for a new treaty; the demand is simply for the government to do what it promised three decades ago.

The central grievances remain unchanged:

1. Militarization: As the banner in the photo highlights, the presence of security forces in the CHT remains disproportionately high. For the indigenous communities, this does not feel like protection; it feels like occupation.

2. Land Grabbing: The most explosive issue is land. Indigenous communal land ownership systems are rarely recognized, leading to dispossession by powerful interests and continued friction with bengali muslim settlers.

3. The Development Paradox: From a sociological perspective, what we see in the CHT is "maldevelopment." Roads and infrastructure are built, often to facilitate military movement or tourism, while the indigenous population remains marginalized, fearing that "development" is just another word for displacement.

A Generational Struggle

What is striking about the current movement is the youth. The people painting the banners today likely weren't born when the Accord was signed. They have inherited a frozen conflict. They are educated, connected, and increasingly vocal about their rights, not just as citizens of Bangladesh, but as indigenous peoples with a distinct history. Their art, their protests, and their online activism are keeping an issue alive that many in the mainstream media would prefer to forget. Peace cannot just be the absence of war. It must be the presence of justice, dignity, and recognized rights.

Until the stipulations of the 1997 Accord move from the page to the reality of the ground in Rangamati, Khagrachari, and Bandarban, the struggle for the CHT is far from over.

The 1900 CHT Manual: A Protective Armor for the Jumma People, and Why Bangladesh Wants It Gone

Introduction

In the long history of the Chittagong Hill Tracts, few documents have shaped the lives of the Jumma peoples as much as the 1900 CHT Regulation, popularly known as the CHT Manual. Introduced during British colonial rule, it was not perfect, but it gave the Indigenous peoples of the hills a legal framework that recognized their distinct identity, land rights, and governance.

Today, the CHT Manual is under threat. The Government of Bangladesh has repeatedly sought to amend or abolish it, claiming modernization — but for the Jumma communities, its removal would mean the final erosion of their legal protection.

What Was the 1900 CHT Manual?

• Introduced by the British in 1900, the Manual legally recognized the unique character of the Hill Tracts as distinct from the Bengali plains.
• It created a system of traditional governance through Circle Chiefs, Headmen, and Karbaris, who oversaw local justice, land use, and community affairs.
• It established the CHT as a “Excluded Area” where non-Indigenous settlement was restricted, protecting Jumma land ownership.
• It preserved the system of communal land tenure (land belonged to the community, not individuals) — vital for jhum cultivation.

In short, the Manual acted like a shield: it wasn’t designed to empower, but it did protect Jumma people from being overrun by outsiders.

Why It Was Protective Armor

Land Rights Safeguard

By restricting outsiders from buying land, it ensured the Jumma could hold on to their ancestral valleys and hills.

Recognition of Traditional Authority

Chiefs and Headmen were recognized as legal administrators, strengthening Indigenous governance.

Cultural Preservation

Limiting migration from the plains reduced forced assimilation and protected languages, customs, and rituals.

Buffer Against Exploitation

As a frontier zone, the Manual functioned as a barrier against colonial and later state overreach into Indigenous lives.

Why Bangladesh Wants to Abolish It

Since 1971, successive governments in Bangladesh have viewed the CHT Manual as a barrier to integration. Their motives include:

• Land and Resource Access — Abolishing the Manual clears the way for Bengali settlers, corporations, and military projects to access land in the hills.
• Centralized Control — The Manual grants power to local chiefs and councils. Dhaka has often sought to weaken this autonomy.
• Nation-State Ideology — By promoting a singular Bengali identity, the state sees the Manual’s recognition of Indigenous governance as a challenge to “national unity.”
• Development Pretext — Governments argue the Manual is “outdated” and hinders modernization. In reality, removing it accelerates land grabbing and militarization.

The Ongoing Battle

• 1997 Peace Accord promised to uphold Indigenous rights, but the Manual remains under constant legal and political attack.
• Amendments have chipped away at its protections, undermining chiefs’ authority and easing restrictions on non-Indigenous settlement.
• For the Jumma, abolishing the Manual would mean losing the last legal recognition of their distinct identity and land rights.

Conclusion

The 1900 CHT Manual was never perfect — it was born out of colonial control. But paradoxically, it gave the Jumma people something rare in South Asia: a legal armor to protect their land and culture.

Today, as Bangladesh moves to dismantle it, the Jumma face the prospect of standing unprotected in the face of land grabs, forced assimilation, and cultural erasure.

To abolish the Manual is not modernization — it is dispossession disguised as reform.